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Abstract
We re-examine the evolutionary stability of the tit-for-tat (tft) strategy in the context of
the iterated prisoner's dilemma, as introduced by Axelrod and Hamilton. This environment
involves a mixture of populations of "organisms" which interact with each other according to
the rules of the prisoner's dilemma, from game theory. The tft strategy is nice, retaliatory
and forgiving, and these properties contributed to the success of the strategy in the earlier
experiments. However, it turns out that the property of being nice represents a weakness,
when competing with an insular strategy. A large population of tfts can resist incursion
by a small number of insulars, but the reverse is also true, which means that tft is not
an evolutionarily stable strategy. In fact, insular strategies prove to be better at resisting
incursion. Finally, we consider the implications of this result, in terms of naturally occurring
societies.
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1 Introduction
In 1981, Axelrod and Hamilton presented a
paper in which they described a simplified
environment in which to study the stability
of various strategies in competition [1]. In
their environment, competition is studied by
modeling organism interactions in the context
of the prisoner's dilemma, from game theory.
The advantage of this context (compared with
some contemporary evolutionary simulations)
is that it has an easily computed metric for
survivability; namely, the number of points an
organism scores, relative to the rest of the pop-
ulation. Based on the stability of the cooper-
ative strategy tit-for-tat (tft), they argued
that cooperation had evolutionary stability.
This paper does not dispute that claim, but
presents new strategies, which seem intuitively
more natural and which prove more durable
than tft. The new strategies are based on the
insular behavior, which cooperates only with
its own kind.
In fact, these simulations can not properly
be called "evolutionary". They model the rise
and fall, and hence the relative "survivabil-
ity", of various configurations of populations
of different species. However, they do not
model the evolutionary machinations which
might have allowed such distributions of pop-
ulations to arise in the first place. These ex-
periments show only how some forces may be
exerted in a specified (simplified!) ecosystem,
but they fail to address the more interesting
systemic questions raised by evolutionary the-
ory. In a real ecosystem, for example, the lions
do not "win" if they consume all the antelope,
yet an individual lion does win if it is a very
successful hunter. In addition, a slightly ad-
vantageous mutation in the lions will select for
corresponding mutations in the antelope, or
vice-versa. Dawkins refers to this type of evo-
lutionary feedback loop as an arms race (2].
Certainly, there are other types of feedback
loops in which some species or individuals ap-
pear to have a symbiotic relationship.' Our
experiments allow a limited, microscopic view
of some of the forces that may be at work in
a real ecosystem, but real ecosystems evolve
as complete systems. In real ecosystems, not
only do mutations occur, but a mutation in
one individual has impact on its own and other
species in the ecosystem. The analyses pre-
sented here, and in the earlier paper, proceed
by dissecting the behavior of each species and
studying its performance in different mixes of
populations. Thus, we are making some very
broad simplifications.
The Experiment
We simulate a mixed population of differ-
ent "species" of organisms, competing against
each other for survival. When any two or-
ganisms encounter each other they have only
two options, as prescribed by the rules for the
Prisoner's Dilemma [3]. Specifically, when en-
countering another creature, an organism may
either cooperate, or defect. So, with two organ-
isms each choosing between two actions, there
are four possible interactions as shown in fig-
ure 1.
An initial population of organisms is gener-
ated. Then the simulation steps through the
entire population, taking each organism and
having it interact with another organism from
the environment, chosen at random.2 When
two organisms interact, their strategies decide
'We say these relationships "appear" symbiotic
(connoting mutualism), because it is impossible to
assess the real meaning of a fragment of an ecosys-
tem, especially when only viewed over a fragment of
evolutionary history. For example, it could turn out
that a relationship between A and B ultimately con-
tributed to the extinction of C, which might later have
saved the pair from being overrun by D, a late-arriving
competitor.
2As a determinist, I think the words "at random"
should always appear in quotes.
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Figure 1: The distribution of points in the 4 possible scenarios where A meets B in the Prisoner's
Dilemma game.
to cooperate or defect, without knowing the
choice of the other. Points are then assigned
to each of the organisms, based on the table in
figure 1. The lifespan is the number of times
the simulation steps through the entire popu-
lation, before deciding to stop and produce the
next generation. The lifespan is really an aver-
age over the population, because some organ-
isms may interact slightly more than others,
if they are more often chosen as the random
partner for other organisms.
After a lifespan, a number of individuals of
each species is produced for the next genera-
tion, in proportion to the relative number of
points scored by that species. For example,
if tft individuals account for 20% of the total
points in the fifth generation, then 20% of the
individuals in the sixth generation will be tft.
The total population is kept fixed (at 50) and
the absolute number of points scored is not
important. If p is the total population and a
species accounts for less than 1/p of the to-
tal points, then that species will not appear
in the next generation3 . The simulation con-
tinues until one species prevails, or a specified
3However, for any species scoring more than 1/p
points, there may be some fractional point remainder.
For example, if tft accounts for 1.999/p of the total
score, then it would generate one individual in the
next generation, but would have lost "credit" for the
additional 0.999/p points it scored. So, this remainder
is accumulated and awarded to the species most hurt
by "round off'. Thus, tft would be counted for 2/p
points, producing 2 offspring instead of just one.
number of generations have elapsed.
Some Strategies
3.1 DEFECTOR
The prisoner's dilemma is a game-theoretic
model which is intended to capture an intu-
ition about the nature of cooperation in a hos-
tile setting. The points are distributed so as to
produce a dilemma. If you could always defect
while your opponent always cooperated, you
would get the most possible points. Also, if
your opponents might sometimes defect, then
at least you would never get "taken". This
simplest of strategies could be called the de-
fector:
* always defect
Unfortunately, if everyone uses this strategy,
nobody cooperates and everyone is stuck mak-
ing 1 point per move. It is a safe strategy, and
is arguably the best strategy to take if there is
a low likelihood of two organisms ever encoun-
tering each other twice. An organism that is
too trusting will provide an easy living for the
"con men" (i.e. defectors). This is the root
of the dilemma.
I
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3.2 TIT-FOR-TAT
The strategy called tit-for-tat (henceforth,
tft) can introduce cooperative behavior with-
out being repeatedly "taken" by other organ-
isms it encounters. Tft behaves as follows
with each individual it meets:
* on the 1' t encounter,
cooperate
* on the nt h encounter,
do what the other guy did
on the (n-l)th encounter.
Tft is successful because it does not con-
tinue to cooperate with others once they have
defected (retaliation), yet it will resume co-
operating after the other cooperates (forgive-
ness). It also initially cooperates with ev-
eryone it meets (niceness), which is under-
stood as promoting cooperation. In the long
run, this strategy will approach break-even,
even with the most malicious opponent, be-
cause tft always gains back what it loses be-
fore cooperating.4 Also, if two tft organisms
meet, they will rack up the maximum number
of (collective) points because they will never
have reason to defect.5 This is the basic idea
behind Axelrod and Hamilton's assertion that
cooperation is an Evolutionarily Stable Strat-
egy (ESS). They showed both that a few indi-
viduals with this strategy are capable of over-
running a larger population of defectors, and
that a large population of tfts are capable of
resisting incursion by defectors.
In figure 2, the effect of initial population
distribution is shown. Each datapoint repre-
4 Axelrod and Hamilton note that tft depends on
a high likelihood of meeting any individual more than
once.
5It is a significant property of the scoring that the
total score for two cooperating organisms (3 + 3) is
greater than the total score during a "con" (5 + 0).
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Figure 2: Initial population distribution af-
fects the "latency" of the prevailing species
sents an average, over 3 different runs, of the
number of generations required for one species
to prevail, given some starting distribution.
We refer to this as the latency, where a latency
of 3 means that the third generation consists
of only one species. The type of marker indi-
cates the species that finally prevailed, which
in this case was nearly always tft. The bars
around the data points indicate the range of
the actual data. The lifespan was set at 200.
In the case where the initial distribution was
10% tft and 90% defector, the simulation ran
until it was called a draw at 50 generations, on
all three runs. Examination of the population
after such a draw shows that the distribution
is still 10% tft, so this particular equilibrium
seems very stable.
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3.3 INSULAR
Observe that tft is a rather egalitarian strat-
egy. It suggests a social philosophy in which
individuals participate equally in the forma-
tion of cooperatives. Tft suggests the power of
a collection of "nice" individuals, which "retal-
iate" when attacked and which "forgive" when
appeased. Another possible strategy, which we
call insular, places more dependence on the
collective by favoring other individuals of its
own kind. Here is insular's strategy:
This strategy, distasteful as it may seem,
trounces tft in a wide range of settings. The
trick is that every insular can con every
tft once. After that, every previously ac-
quainted different-species pair will mutually
defect, while every same-species pair will co-
operate. The "edge" gotten in the first en-
counter, is the essential advantage for insular.
The rest is a matter of the weight of numbers
of the two opposing populations. It was noted
in [1] that tft depends on a high likelihood of
meeting any organism more than once. We
preserve this condition by using a lifespan of
200. We could elaborate the model by suppos-
ing that different species might inhabit physi-
cal niches, increasing the relative likelihood of
same-species contacts, or by supposing that an
insular individual could tell when it was at a
disadvantage and would then begin cooperat-
ing more, or by supposing insular was more
motile, or shorter-lived, or by increasing the
payoff for a "con", and so forth.
The insular strategy, as the name suggests,
is better at resisting incursion than tft is. This
is the main result on which this paper is based.
Figure 3 shows latency over initial population
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-
-
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 0O
% of INSULAR in inirial population
(the rest is TIT-FOR-TA'T)
Figure 3: Initial population ratio vs.
for tft and insular
latency,
distributions for insular versus tft. Empirical
experiments show that insular tends to pre-
vail if given more than 42% of the total initial
population (21 out of 50). This equilibrium
is not quite as stable as the one shown in fig-
ure 2, due perhaps to the fact that our total
population is only 50.
3.4 INSULAR2
Insular uses a type-check to recognize others
of its kind without ever interacting with them.
This might be considered as "cheating", be-
cause it involves a facility other than memory
to support a strategy. This may also contra-
dict the premise of the prisoner's dilemma it-
self, because insular gets information through
channels other than cooperation and defec-
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* IF the other guy is also an insular,
THEN cooperate
ELSE defect
2f20
tion. (Given our context, this is not really
such an unreasonable technique. We might
suppose that selection would tend to produce
just such "builtin" capabilities as these. We
will return to this thought in section 5.) Any-
how, in order to play more fairly, we devel-
oped a version of insular, called insular2,
which recognizes its own kind using a behav-
ioral protocol based on a specific sequence of
cooperations and defections. 6 Insular2 uses
the simplest signaling and recognition proto-
col that will allow it to distinguish insular2s
from defectors, tfts and insulars.
In practice, the implementation of this be-
havior is simpler than its description here. The
point is that this protocol suffices to recognize
other insular2s and to selectively cooperate
only with them. This strategy dominates tft,
but loses out to insular which need never co-
operate with any but its compatriots. Note
6We refer to this as the nudge-nudge wink-wink
protocol
also, that each insular2 will be conned once
by each defector, just as each tft will be
conned once by each insular2, but the dif-
ference is that the insular2s are capable of
intra-species cooperation, while the defectors
are not. This gives insular2 an advantage
over defector, which tft does not have over
insular2, as suggested by figure 4. Empiri-
cally, we found a transition point (rather than
a stable equilibrium) at starting populations
of between 43% insular2 (22 out of 50) and
46% insular2 (23 out of 50).
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Figure 4: tft versus insular2
Some Analysis
The insular2 strategy defects in its first in-
teraction with anyone. This means that "nice"
tft gets conned in its initial dealings with each
* on the 1't encounter,
defect
* on the 2nd encounter,
IF opponent defected on 1 it move
THEN cooperate
ELSE defect
* on the 3'd encounter,
IF opponent defected on 1st move,
AND cooperated on 2nd move
THEN "recognize" opponent
(cooperate)
ELSE defect
* on the nth encounter,
IF opponent is "recognized"
THEN cooperate
ELSE defect
O Insular2
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insular2. However, other insular2s are not
conned, because they mutually defect on their
first meeting. In the second encounter with an
insular2, tft will defect, but the insular2 will
also defect, because it will recall that tft did
not defect in the first encounter and is there-
fore necessarily not a fellow insular2. The ef-
fects of the first encounter are as follows, show-
ing all possible pairings of tft, insular2 and
defector:
Strategy A vs Strategy B
TFT
TFT
TFT
INSULAR2
INSULAR2
DEFECTOR
TFT
INSULAR2
DEFECTOR
INSULAR2
DEFECTOR
DEFECTOR
In the second encounter between two insu-
lar2s, both will cooperate. A second en-
counter between an insular2 and a defector
will hurt the insular2, but it will never trust
the defector again. In other words, insular2
and tft score identically against defector, for
any number of moves greater than 1. How-
ever, insular2 scores better against tft than
vice-versa, because insular2 profits from the
initial encounter. After two encounters, in-
sular2s have recognized each other (using the
nudge-nudge wink-wink protocol) and will al-
ways cooperate in the future. On the second
encounter, things go as follows (accumulated
totals are in square brackets)
TFT
TFT
TFT
INSULAR2
INSULAR2
DEFECTOR
TFT
INSULAR2
DEFECTOR
INSULAR2
DEFECTOR
DEFECTOR
Every subsequent move now adds a constant
value to every individual. The insular2s are
cooperating with the insular2s, the tfts are
cooperating with the tfts, and all other com-
binations are mutually defecting.
TFT
TFT
TFT
INSULAR2
INSULAR2
DEFECTOR
TFT
INSULAR2
DEFECTOR
INSULAR2
DEFECTOR
DEFECTOR
This means that after the second move, the
determining factors are the initial distribution
of species and the lifespan. The tft population
can regain its collective deficit only if there
are enough more of them, and enough time, to
out-cooperate the insular2 population. The
same argument holds, in the case where no de-
fectors are initially present, except that here
tft is only conned by one species and insular2
is never conned.
Notice that insular2 is extremely vulnera-
ble to a new organism that imitates the insu-
lar2 protocol for two moves and then defects.
In fact, insular2 even lacks the ability to "re-
taliate" because it considers recognition to be
final and will always cooperate with other or-
ganisms once it has "recognized" them as fel-
low insular2s. Thus, insular2's deep "im-
printing" is a risky design, if we allow new
organisms to be introduced. This could be
fixed by giving insular2 the ability to change
its mind about other insular2s which subse-
quently defect. It would then only be vulner-
able once, to being conned by this new organ-
ism. However, that one con was sufficient to
give insular2 the edge over tft, so it should
also be sufficient to give the new organism an
edge over insular2.
The relative invulnerability of insular to
deception suggests that a reliable and inex-
pensive recognition protocol is a valuable com-
ponent of insular strategies.7  However, an
7An interesting subtlety was discovered when we
realized that the original insular strategy was vdlner-
overly cautious recognition protocol might of-
ten make insular2s behave more like defec-
tors, which would prevent them from develop-
ing cooperative relationships.
In the algorithm described earlier, the part-
ner for each organism is selected at random
from the environment. Fluctuations in data-
points, in the earlier figures, show where the
"latency" of the dominant species is most sen-
sitive to slight fluctuations in the numbers
of encounters between and within the various
species in the environment. In order to assure
that tft has a sufficient probability of meeting
any opponent at least twice, it is necessary to
make the lifespan long enough that most en-
counters with tfts will in fact occur more than
twice. It is instructive to look at the results of
a non-randomized algorithm, where every pair
of organisms would meet some precise number
of times. The results in figure 5 were obtained
by introducing every individual to every other
individual a fixed number of times per gener-
ation. The different lines show datapoints for
2, 3, 4 and 10 meetings per generation. This
data makes the analysis a little more clear.
Where the curves touch the top margin, the
populations were at equilibrium. The general
trend, as expected, is for the equilibrium point
to move towards the 50% distribution level,
as the number of encounters per organism per
generation increases. This is because the ex-
tra points scored by each insular2 in its initial
encounter with each tft, account for less of the
total score when more interactions happen per
generation.
Figure 5 also illustrates a loophole in
the reproduction algorithm, described in sec-
able to "ininuicry" in the form of super-types, because
it used the Lisp typep function to do its recognition.
A super-type object, could pass the typep test without
being specifically of insular type. This was easily re-
paired by making the test more specific, but it demon-
strates that even "built-in" recognition protocols may
be vulnerable.
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Figure 5: tft versus insular2 using precise
numbers of meetings between individuals.
tion 2. Notice that the curve for 3 meet-
ings/generation, appears to be at equilibrium
at alllow percentages of insular2. In fact, the
latency of tft is decreasing for lower values of
insular2 in that part of the graph. In those
experiments, tft would tend to dominate, ex-
cept a "false" equilibrium is reached at 48 tfts
and 2 insular2s. What happens is that those
2 insular2s score between 3 and 4% of the
total points, enough to generate 1.5+ individ-
uals in the next generation. This is rounded to
1 individual, with a remainder of 0.5+. How-
ever, the reproduction algorithm awards the
total remainder, after rounding, to the species
that was most hurt by "round off error" (see
footnote on page 2). Thus, one more insular2
individual is produced, for a total of 2 insu-
lar2s, and the cycle repeats indefinitely. This
round-off crediting may account for slight per-
turbations in latency values, but the points
of equilibria shown in the earlier figures are
empirically not of this "false" type. This evi-
dence is also supported visually by the falling
away of latency on both sides of our equilib-
rium points.
5 Reflections
Consider the wolf pack, the school of fish,
the flock of birds, and so forth. Though
some cooperative social endeavors may be
more loosely knit, we can see that "banding
together" is common throughout the animal
kingdom. We are deeply attached to the val-
ues of our own society, so it might be easier
to consider the study of social insects. Higher
degrees of "sociality" in insects are generally
defined to involve various aspects of care for
the young, collective food consumption, and
so forth [6]. In this way it becomes more
clear that a "society", by human definitions,
has a collective self-interest. Human collec-
tives seem to exist at the level of the fam-
ily, neighborhood, city, state, nation, and (in
the case of some of the more enlightened) the
planet or even the macrocosm. It could also
be argued that there are collective principles
involved in schools, businesses, religions, and
political movements. These collectives seem
to be natural aspects of human society and
yet they may also seem to be the source of
much of what we find destructive in human
society. We sense bigotry and exploitation to
be offensive because they suggest the use of
cooperative effort to maintain the authority of
an "elite", regardless of the competence of the
unestablished challengers. Yet it seems pretty
clear, for example, that humans consider hu-
nan lives to be more valuable than the lives
of other species. This paper does not claim
to resolve these difficult social issues. How-
ever, our simple experiments with the Iterated
Prisoner's Dilemma suggest that there may be
evolutionary forces that favor self-preserving
social orders.
It makes for interesting speculation to con-
sider that some antisocial or exploitive be-
havior we observe in human society could be
viewed as the product of overly restrictive
recognition protocols; overly narrow criteria
for recognizing one's "own kind". We might
also imagine that the much touted discrimina-
tory and manipulative capabilities of humans
could sometimes have the unfortunate side-
effect of making it harder to appreciate one's
relationship to other humans, other species,
and to the ecosystem as a whole. Yet, there
are many levels of differentiation which indi-
viduals may use to identify their "own kind".
Could it be that these communities of greater
or lesser generality are sensed in relation to.
specific types of situations? For example, de-
pending on the perceived nature of specific
challenges, we may consider ourselves as in-
dividuals; as members of a family, city, na-
tion, or species; as holders of a perspective,
philosophy or religion; as attributed with gen-
der, heritage, lifestyle, income, disability, trau-
matic experience, achievement; and so forth.
Perhaps it is this flexible group identification
that has given homo sapiens its (recent) sur-
vivability?
The assessment of niceness as a "weakness"
in tft should be qualified. In the oversimpli-
fied environment of these experiments, we are
missing some of the more complex forces that
are necessary to hold a society together when
faced with new challenges. I have argued that
"banding together" may be an evolutionarily
stable strategy, but we should be careful about
extrapolating this as a justification for bias.
Excessive elitism may be just as destabilizing
as excessive niceness. While there may be so-
cial forces (analogous to those demonstrated
with our simulated organisms) that promote
"banding together", there might also be com-
plimentary forces that censor those organisms
having overly rigid recognition protocols. In
fact, as we speculated before, overly rigid
recognition protocols may ironically produce
"anti-social" behavior. Human societies seem
to perceive such behavior as threatening, and
threatening things are also often considered
to be "alien", so perhaps there is a dynamic
tension between the elitist and communal im-
pulses. In this way, the "banding together"
impulse may actually be self-regulating. Eli-
tist individuals or sub-societies are perceived
as a threat by the rest of society, yet society
itself is in some ways an elitist endeavor.
The evidence seems strong that social prin-
ciples may be genetically "programmed" in
a species. At least, most people would not
hesitate to recognize this in other species.
But, what about humans? We'd like to think
that our social systems are built on something
uniquely superior to genetic influence, namely,
the perception of justice and our sense of be-
longing. I propose that a sense of justice and
of belonging, and other things, may in fact be
part of our genetic heritage. It seems clear
that they are part of the "glue" that holds
human societies together. Since humans have
evolved in societies, it doesn't seem unreason-
able that societies and individuals should be
so subtly interwoven.
6 Future Work
We still need to explore a more "realistic" con-
text for observing evolution in action. For
example, why not allow "mutations" which
would produce slight deviations in the recog-
nition protocol of insular2s? Such a muta-
tion could produce the briefly-described be-
havior which tricks insular2 by mimicking
its recognition protocol and then defecting.
As recognition and deception enter the pic-
ture, species might begin to develop interde-
pendent predator-prey relationships, such that
the predators kill, and yet depend on the sur-
vival of the prey species that they have evolved
to hunt. Perhaps, interspecies symbioses could
evolve in such systems, eventually yielding the
kind of systemic interdependence which we
found lacking in the current experiments.
Unfortunately, the metaphorical context of
the prisoner's dilemma is at odds with the sys-
temic perspective, as this paper has implic-
itly demonstrated. The prisoner's dilemma
doesn't offer much flexibility for appreciating
the subtle relationships found in real ecosys-
tems. For example, organisms would have to
"cooperate" with organisms higher on the food
chain, while "defecting" with organisms lower
on the food chain (the Sun, at the bottom, co-
operates with plankton and does not need to
reproduce). But this terminology is awkward
and seems to take too microscopic a view of
the activity in an ecosystem.
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